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Much of the research on ethnicity, development and 
conflict implicitly assumes that ethnic groups act 
collectively in pursuit of their interests. Collective 
political action is typically facilitated by political parties 
able to make credible commitments to pursue group 
interests. Other work, however, emphasizes the lack of 
political credibility as a source of adverse development 
outcomes. Evidence presented here uses partisan 
preferences across 16 Sub-Saharan African countries to 
distinguish these positions. The evidence is inconsistent 
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with the credibility of party commitments to pursue 
collective ethnic interests: ethnic clustering of political 
support is less widespread than expected; members of 
clustered ethnic groups exhibit high rates of partisan 
disinterest and are only slightly more likely to express a 
partisan preference; and partisan preferences are more 
affected by factors, such as gift-giving, often associated 
with low political credibility. These findings emphasize 
the importance of looking beyond ethnicity in analyses of 
economic development.  
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The ethnicity distraction?  Political credibility and partisan 
preferences in Africa 
 
Researchers have linked competition between ethnic groups to adverse development 
phenomena ranging from slow growth and the under-provision of public goods to conflict.  
Other research, looking at the determinants of ethnic voting, has concluded that uninformed 
voters use ethnicity as a cue about candidate policy preferences.  The power of these 
arguments hinges on whether political competitors can credibly commit to pursuing the 
collective interests of co-ethnics.  If they cannot, their ability to mobilize electoral support 
with broad ethnic appeals and their political incentives to pursue development-friendly 
policies are both attenuated.  Similarly, ethnic cues are more important when co-ethnic 
politicians can make credible commitments to pursue the collective interests of their ethnic 
groups.  Whether political competitors can, in fact, make these credible commitments has 
not been the subject of detailed research.   
In a first attempt to examine this issue, this paper asks whether political parties are 
vehicles for the collective organization of ethnic groups.  If they are, and if ethnicity is the 
most salient dimension of political competition, three phenomena should be observed.  
Ethnic groups should disproportionately favor one party over others; members of such 
clustered ethnic groups should exhibit low rates of partisan indifference and be much more 
likely to express a partisan preference than members of other groups; and other strategies for 
mobilizing political support, particularly those associated with non-credible political 
commitments, such as gift-giving, should have a small effect on partisan preferences.     2
Though Africa is a central focus of research on ethnicity, voting and development, 
data from Afrobarometer surveys in 16 countries are inconsistent with these predictions.1  
First, ethnic clustering of partisan support appears to be less pronounced than is implied by 
the literature on ethnicity in Africa.  Five different definitions of clustering are explored here.  
Under the one which comes closest to capturing theoretical descriptions of the role of 
ethnicity in politics, only 25 percent of respondents belong to clustered ethnic groups.  No 
ethnic groups at all meet this standard in approximately half of the 16 countries.   
Second, respondents from clustered ethnic groups are not substantially more likely to 
express a partisan preference than respondents from non-clustered parties.  In country-by-
country estimates, half or more of the countries exhibit no statistically significant difference 
between clustered and non-clustered respondents in the likelihood of expressing a partisan 
preference.  In only two countries where they consistently exhibit a significant difference 
(South Africa and Mozambique) does the evidence support the claim that parties have made 
credible commitments.   
The third indication of the lack of credibility of partisan appeals to ethnic groups is 
that even respondents from clustered ethnic groups express high rates of partisan 
indifference.  A large fraction of these respondents indicate that they are “not close to any 
party” (around 35 percent, almost three times the rate at which American voters declare 
themselves to be independents).  Finally, fourth, the magnitude of other determinants of 
                                                 
1 The 16 countries are typical.  They exhibit the high levels of ethnic fractionalization (.69) associated 
in the literature with poor development outcomes, similar to levels in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
and far higher than in the rest of the world (.37) (Alesina, et al. (2002); fractionalization is the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same ethnic group).      3
partisan preference, such as vote-buying, is similar to the effects of ethnic clustering, again 
suggesting that appeals to the collective interests of ethnic groups are not the main 
determinant of electoral mobilization in these countries.   
The analysis cannot reject the possibility that groups still act collectively through 
other, non-party means.  Individual politicians or political families, by virtue of their personal 
relationships with co-ethnics (e.g., as the patrons sitting atop large clientelist networks), or 
non-partisan organizations of other kinds, might be able to make credible commitments to 
most co-ethnics.  If these individuals or organizations have only loose partisan connections, 
strong ethnic support for co-ethnic candidates could exist together with high rates of 
partisan indifference.  Nevertheless, though plausible in principle, these possibilities imply a 
breadth of clientelist networks or a level of penetration of non-party organizations that are 
inconsistent with most depictions of African politics.   
A second explanation for high clustering and high partisan indifference is precisely 
that political competitors cannot make broadly credible promises and the clientelist networks 
to which they can make credible promises are narrow.  Clients are more likely to be co-
ethnics, giving rise to clustering, but most co-ethnics are excluded from clientelist networks 
and therefore exhibit high rates of partisan indifference.  This interpretation is consistent 
with most analyses of African politics; several variables associated with clientelist appeals, 
such as gift-giving, are significant determinants of partisan preference in the analysis here.    
Fear is a third potential explanation of clustering and high rates of indifference.  
Politicians cannot make credible commitments to defend the interests of an ethnic group, 
giving rise to partisan indifference, but the belief that co-ethnic politicians are less likely to 
predate on voters than others leads to ethnic clustering of political support.  To partially 
account for this, the analysis examines the effect of ethnic grievance on partisan preference.    4
Different explanations for ethnic clustering call for distinct policy responses to the 
appearance of ethnic conflict.  If ethnic groups are collectively organized and policy failures 
represent conflicts among genuinely divergent ethnic preferences, then appropriate policy 
responses are institutional arrangements that facilitate policy compromises.  In contrast, if 
ethnicity is a side effect of the lack of political credibility, efforts to build parties or other 
organizations (ethnic or not) is more appropriate.   
The next section of the paper briefly reviews the broad literature on ethnicity in 
development and in the politics of developing countries.  The argument is then developed 
that credible ethnic appeals should influence ethnic clustering of partisan support and rates 
of partisan preference.  The empirical strategy, particularly the construction of variables that 
distinguish ethnic groups that cluster on parties and ethnic groups that do not, is then 
described.  As the final section explains, the results suggest greater focus on underlying 
factors in African politics that give rise both to the salience of ethnicity in politics and to 
policy choices that hinder development.   
Ethnicity, credibility and development in the literature  
This paper contributes to two strands of research on ethnicity.  One investigates the 
impact of ethnic fragmentation or polarization on development outcomes.  The findings 
below call into question the implicit assumption in this work, that ethnic leaders credibly 
represent the preferences of their ethnic groups.  The other strand asks why ethnic voting 
emerges.  The analysis supports one, under-examined explanation, the inability of politicians 
to make credible commitments to broad groups of citizens. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) show that ethnic fragmentation is associated with slow 
growth, particularly in Africa, and refer to two arguments in the literature to explain the 
finding.  Ethnicity may lead to a common pool problem in which each group predates on   5
public resources without taking into account consequences for other groups.  It may also 
increase the tendency of each group to oppose reforms in the broader public interest.  
Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show that levels of locally-provided public goods are lower in 
more ethnically fragmented communities in Kenya.  Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) emphasize that because of preference differences among 
ethnic groups, ethnic diversity can reduce public good provision.  The assumption 
underlying these arguments is that politicians represent the collective interests of ethnic 
groups and those interests conflict.  In contrast, the analysis here indicates that African 
political parties, at least, do not appear to mobilize support with credible commitments to 
serve the collective interests of any groups, including ethnic groups.   
Research has also linked ethnicity to conflict, again a phenomenon to which Sub-
Saharan Africa is exceptionally vulnerable.  In a careful analysis of ethnicity and conflict, 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue ethnic polarization, rather than fragmentation, 
drives conflict.  To test these arguments, they devise empirical measures of ethnic 
polarization that closely reflect the analysis in Esteban and Rey (1994), who conclude that 
polarization is greatest when groups are approximately equally sized and large.   
The collective organization of polarized groups has two effects on conflict.  One is 
ambiguous:  collectively organized ethnic groups are better able both to attack other ethnic 
groups and to defend against aggression:  defensive capability deters conflict, but the 
capacity to act offensively encourages it.  Another is not:  collectively organized ethnic 
groups are better able to make credible commitments with each other that forestall conflict.   
For example, Bardhan (1997) concludes that polarization leads to conflict when 
institutions that allow for credible inter-ethnic agreement are absent.  Fearon and Laitin 
(1996), though, argue that inter-group agreements are more credible when groups   6
themselves can police and punish deviations by own-group members against the other 
group.  Lake and Rothchild (1996) also trace conflict to a breakdown in the collective 
organization of an ethnic group.  They observe that ethnic conflict is most likely when 
political entrepreneurs, operating within ethnic groups, exploit fears of insecurity.  Other 
research examines how leaders exploit ethnicity to trigger conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 
Blimes 2006).  Such behavior is less likely to emerge when ethnic groups can collectively 
constrain counterproductive behavior by group leaders.  The analysis here can therefore 
explain why ethnicity and conflict are particularly linked in the African context:  intra-ethnic 
organization, as manifested in the ability of political parties to make credible ethnic appeals,  
is weak, making inter-ethnic agreements difficult to enforce.2   
A large literature examines ethnic voting, particularly in Africa.  In a recent 
contribution, Eifert, Miguel and Posner (forthcoming) show that respondents to 
Afrobarometer surveys were 1.8 percent more likely to identify themselves ethnically rather 
than in terms of another social categorization, such as occupation, for every month closer a 
competitive election was to the timing of the survey in a country.  Lindberg and Morrison 
(2008) question the importance of ethnicity, arguing that in their Ghanaian sample, most 
respondents explain their political preferences in terms of incumbent performance; few 
acknowledge ethnic motivations or vote-buying.  Ferree, Gibson, Hoffman and Long (2009), 
also looking at Ghana, also find that performance evaluations are important, but in their 
analysis ethnicity is still a significant determinant of partisan preferences.   
                                                 
2 This evidence is also consistent with evidence in Keefer (2008), showing that insurgency is more 
likely when political parties are vehicles of individual leaders and party members are less able to act 
collectively to sanction leaders for not defending their interests.     7
Ferree (2006) summarizes three common explanations for ethnic voting.  Ethnic 
voting could be a simple expression of ethnic identity, unprompted by politicians’ 
commitments to serve ethnic interests in any tangible way.  It could also be coincidental:  
policy cleavages simply overlap with ethnic differences.  Finally, as Chandra (2004), Posner 
(2005), and Ferree argue, ethnic voting could emerge because uninformed voters use 
ethnicity as a cue about politician preferences.  The second and third differ only with respect 
to voter information.  The effects of both, however, depend on whether voters also believe 
that politicians have incentives to avoid shirking on commitments they make to co-ethnics.   
The results below point to a complementary explanation for ethnic voting.  In an 
environment in which political competitors cannot make credible commitments to broad 
groups of voters, they resort to clientelist appeals to members of their clientelist networks – 
networks defined precisely by the ability of members to make mutually credible 
commitments (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008).  This argument is consistent with a large literature 
arguing that politics in Africa is largely clientelist and that political appeals are rooted in 
patron-client ties.  Bratton and van de Walle (1997) emphasize clientelism and the dominant 
role of the “big man” in African politics.  Van de Walle (2001) concludes that in many 
African countries “democratization has had little impact on economic decision making, 
because the new democratic regimes remain governed by neo-patrimonial logic (p. 18).”  
Broadly credible appeals to favor an entire ethnic group are generally inconsistent with such 
neo-patrimonial logic, though the clients of “big men” may primarily be co-ethnics.   
Specific country studies support the argument that the clients of “big men” are more 
likely to be members – though only a subset –  of the same ethnic group.  Stroh’s (2009) 
field research in Burkina Faso emphasizes that parties look for candidates who are fils du 
terroir, sons of the earth, who are deeply rooted in their local communities – that is, who   8
control a substantial clientelist network, regardless of ethnicity.  Erdmann (2007) argues that 
clientelist networks are likely to be ethnically homogeneous.  Political competition rooted in 
patron-client relationships is less likely to yield political parties capable of making broad 
appeals to citizens:  the large fraction of citizens who are outside of clientelist networks have 
no reason to believe the promises of political parties that represent the association of 
clientelist networks, even if those are comprised of co-ethnics.   
The lack of credibility of political promises can also explain the association of 
ethnicity and poor development outcomes found, for example, in Easterly and Levine 
(1997).  Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) formally demonstrate that political competitors unable to 
make broadly credible commitments are more likely to rely on patron-client appeals, 
restricting their credible commitments to narrow groups of voters.  This has policy 
consequences – weak public good provision, high rent-seeking, and significant emphasis on 
the provision of narrowly targeted policy benefits – that the literature has also associated 
with ethnic politics.3  It also leads to ethnic clustering of partisan support if parties are 
constructed around ethnically homogeneous clientelist networks. 
Any hypothesis of ethnic voting rooted in differences in policy preferences between 
ethnic groups, such as the use of ethnicity as a cue to candidate policy preferences, also 
depends on the credibility of politicians claims to pursue the collective interests of co-
ethnics.  If they cannot, they are more likely to pursue their private interests at the expense 
                                                 
3 The policy choices of younger democracies – those in which politicians are likely to struggle with 
credible commitment – exhibit the pattern of policy performance associated with non-credible 
politicians. However, controls for ethnolinguistic fractionalization do not account for this difference.  
On the contrary, they are usually insignificant in the presence of controls for the years of continuous 
competitive elections (Keefer 2007).     9
of collective interests, rendering the ethnic cue less valuable.  Political parties play a key role 
in establishing the credibility of these ethnic appeals.   
Theory and Hypotheses 
The empirical tests below are based on the argument that groups’ collective interests 
are more likely to be represented in political decision making when a political party can 
credibly commit to representing them.  If political parties can make credible appeals to 
pursue the collective interests of an ethnic group, members of that ethnic group should 
exhibit low rates of partisan indifference and be more likely to express a partisan preference 
than members of unrepresented ethnic groups.   
Groups, including ethnic groups, confront significant obstacles to ensuring that their 
collective interests are represented in political decision making.  One challenge is to verify 
that the politicians that they support share the group’s policy preferences.  Another is to 
monitor whether they actually pursue those interests once in office.  Individually, group 
members have limited incentive to collect this information.  Lacking it, they have no reason 
to believe that politicians will pursue the group’s interests.   
A further challenge is to punish politicians who renege on commitments to serve 
group interests.  Again, individually, group members have limited capacity to punish 
politicians who renege on their commitments to the group.  Instead, groups that are not 
organized to act collectively are in the position of voters in Ferejohn’s (1986) model:  to the 
extent that they can spontaneously coordinate on a performance threshold, group members 
can reject politicians who do not deliver a threshold level of welfare.  The absence of a 
credible challenger to the incumbent means, however, that this threshold is low.  More 
importantly, even this level of accountability requires spontaneous coordination on a 
common performance threshold, which is not assured.     10
 Political parties can mitigate these collective action problems.4  Snyder and Ting 
(2002), for example, describe conditions under which parties’ strategies of candidate 
recruitment provide information to voters about candidate policy preferences.  Party 
affiliation then provides benefits to candidates that they cannot obtain outside the party:  
individuals vote for them because of their party label and not because of direct information 
about the candidates’ individual characteristics.  Parties can also limit excessive rent-seeking 
by politicians in ways that individual group members cannot, by coordinating group 
responses to non-performing politicians, ensuring at least the level of performance suggested 
by models of ex post voting behavior, as in Ferejohn (1986).  They can also facilitate non-
electoral collective action against politicians who shirk (e.g., demonstrations).   
Finally, following Aldrich’s (1995) argument, parties that credibly represent the 
interests of a group allow members of the group to punish the party’s politicians collectively 
for policy failures, even when they are uncertain about the contribution of any individual 
politician to the failure.  Knowing this, a party’s politicians have an incentive to block rent-
seeking by any one of their group unless they all receive a share of the rent that at least 
offsets the electoral losses that all will experience as a result of rent-seeking.  The larger the 
share of rents that a president or head of a legislative assembly has to surrender to members 
                                                 
4 Non-party organizations can also facilitate collective political action by groups; the analysis below 
cannot exclude the possibility that they do in Africa.   However, if this were true, political parties 
should still play a large role.  Though unions in Great Britain, for example, represented the group 
interests of workers, political candidates favoring union interests ran as candidates of the Labour 
Party, to which unions provided the bulk of the financing (Eggers and Hainmueller 2009).  In this 
case, levels of partisan indifference among the working class continues to be a valid signal of the 
degree to which their collective interests are represented.     11
of the legislature, the less attractive rent-seeking is to them.  Even if individual politicians can 
each make credible commitments to some co-ethnics, the absence of a unifying ethnic party 
makes it more likely that they will shirk on commitments to the entire ethnic group.   
Though political parties organized to pursue the collective interests of an ethnic 
group allow the group to limit shirking by co-ethnic politicians, parties are often not 
organized for this purpose.  Citizens do not believe that parties will discipline members who 
shirk; party candidates do not believe that their support base hinges on their party affiliation.  
If such a party does exist, members of the targeted ethnic group should be less likely to 
indicate, in answer to an Afrobarometer question, that they do not feel “close to any party.”  
They should also be more likely to express a partisan preference than members of ethnic 
groups that are not the target of appeals, depending on the salience of ethnic preferences.   
There are three cases.  In the first, non-ethnic parties appeal equally to all ethnic 
groups: the fraction of each ethnic group that “does not feel close” to these non-ethnic 
parties is similar across all ethnic groups.  In this case, members of an ethnic group that is 
targeted by a credible ethnic party should exhibit lower levels of partisan indifference or 
distance than members of other groups.  The more important is ethnicity, the larger should 
be the difference.  In the second, non-ethnic parties actually appeal more to targeted ethnic 
groups than to those unrepresented by a party.  Here again, as long as the ethnic party is 
credible, the targeted ethnic group should exhibit significantly lower rates of partisan 
indifference or distance compared to other ethnic groups.   
In the third case, non-ethnic parties appeal more to non-targeted ethnic groups.  
Members of the targeted ethnic group could express higher levels of partisan indifference, 
depending on whether ethnicity is more salient to the targeted ethnic group than non-ethnic 
issues are to the non-targeted groups.  For example, ethnic groups may not be targeted by an   12
ethnic party because, for these groups, ethnicity is simply less salient than other issues 
(contrary to the presumption of most observers of African politics).  However, it should still 
be the case that, after controlling for respondent characteristics that make them susceptible 
to the appeals of non-ethnic parties, ethnic groups targeted with credible ethnic appeals 
should exhibit higher rates of partisan preference.   
In sum, if ethnic groups are the target of appeals by credible ethnic parties, members 
of the ethnic groups must disproportionately vote for those parties (exhibit ethnic 
clustering).  If they do not cluster, either parties cannot mobilize the support of the ethnic 
group (e.g., with credible appeals, by mobilizing ethnically homogeneous clientelist networks, 
or with fear) or ethnicity is simply not salient.  The foregoing arguments then make two 
predictions.  First, those who cluster should be substantially more likely to express a partisan 
preference than members of other ethnic groups; and, second, alternative party strategies for 
mobilizing support should have a weaker impact on expressions of partisan interest than 
membership in a clustered ethnic group.   
Specification and data 
Equation (1) is estimated to assess the degree to which members of clustered ethnic 
groups members are more likely to express a partisan preference than members of other 
ethnic groups.  It assumes a logistic distribution and relies on survey data on individuals i 
from 16 countries j.   
(1)  j ij ij ij ij Clustering   Ethnic   (0,1)   Preference    Partisan            2 1 0   
The ethnic clustering dummy variable is equal to one for ethnic groups who 
disproportionately support particular parties; every respondent from an ethnic group shares 
the same clustering value, regardless of whether the respondent supports the cluster party.  If   13
a substantially higher fraction of co-ethnic respondents express a partisan preference, the 
coefficient β1 will be large and significant.   
Fixed country effects,  j   are likely to be (and are) large.  The base specification 
controls for these.   In general, the addition of group indicators to conditional likelihood 
estimators like the logit yields inconsistent estimates.  However, this is only a concern when 
the number of groups is large and the observations in any group are small.  In the sample 
here, with only 16 groups (countries) and more than a thousand observations per group, bias 
is not a concern (Chamberlain 1980).   
The effects on rates of partisan preference of ethnic clustering and other control 
variables may also vary across countries:   j j          .  For a large number of countries, each 
with a relatively small number of observations, the appropriate econometric response is to 
take parameter heterogeneity explicitly into account with a generalized least squares 
approach.  However, since the country-specific idiosyncratic effects  j  are likely to be 
uncorrelated across countries, it is inefficient to use GLS, particularly because the number of 
countries is small relative to the number of observations per country.  Instead, to examine 
the possible effects of parameter heterogeneity, the final section of the paper simply reports 
country-by-country estimates.   
The data on partisan preferences, ethnic clustering and the controls are taken from 
the 2005-06, third round of the Afrobarometer surveys.  Afrobarometer uses a nationally-
representative sample (generally, 1,200 respondents, but in larger countries 2,400).  Only this 
round includes questions key to the analysis here.  For example, earlier rounds did not ask 
for the ethnicity of respondents, but instead asked respondents to name the social group 
with which they most closely identified (used in Eifert, et al. (forthcoming)), a question that, 
in turn, was not asked in 2005-06.     14
Measuring expressions of partisan preference 
The dependent variable, whether respondents express a partisan preference, is based 
on question 85.  All respondents who answered question 85 with “do not feel close to any 
party”, refused to answer or did not know are coded as having no partisan preference.  
Among these respondents, the vast majority answered “not close to any party”.5   
Rates of partisan indifference are high, by itself strong evidence that political parties 
across the 16 countries struggle to mobilize support with credible pre-electoral commitments 
to voters.  Partisan indifference is near or above 50 percent in four of them and above 30 
percent in eleven.  While Eifert, et al. (forthcoming) find that elections matter for the 
salience of ethnicity, rates of partisan indifference appear to be high regardless of election 
proximity.  In the six countries with elections in 2004, just before the surveys were 
conducted (Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa), 31 percent 
of respondents did not express a partisan preference (Mozambique was lowest, with 18.1 
percent).  The competitiveness of these elections seems also not to have mattered.  
Botswana, Ghana and Malawi had the most competitive elections (the government party 
received 52 percent, 56 percent and 47 percent of the vote respectively), and exhibited rates 
of partisan indifference of 22, 34 and 40 percent, respectively.  Rates of partisan preference 
are low even in countries where ethnic voting is notable.  Although Kenya exhibits high rates 
of ethnic voting, between 35 and 40 percent of Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo express support 
for no party.   
These numbers are high when compared to surveys undertaken by the American 
National Election Studies from 1952-2004, asking “Generally speaking, do you usually think 
of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?”  It is plausible that 
                                                 
5 For example, this is true for all 403 of the Ghanaian respondents coded as having no preference.    15
those who answer Republican or Democrat would also answer “yes” to the Afrobarometer 
question, “Do you feel close to any particular political party?”  The fraction of respondents 
who do not answer Republican or Democrat ranges from eight to 18 percent (in 1974, after 
the Nixon administration and the Watergate scandal), and is most typically eleven or twelve 
percent, well below even the lowest rates of partisan indifference in these 16 countries.6   
Measuring ethnic clustering 
Ethnic clustering is an important indicator in nearly all discussions of ethnicity in 
politics.  Easterly and Levine (1997) motivate their cross-country findings that ethnic 
fragmentation reduces growth with evidence from Kenya.  For example, the Luo candidate 
for president won 75 percent of the vote in the Luo region and the Kalenjin candidate 71 
percent of the vote in the Kalenjin region.  The literature is silent on how precisely to 
measure ethnic clustering, however, generally suggesting only that ethnic groups 
disproportionately support a party or parties.  This “lax” clustering standard allows a single 
ethnic group to cluster on multiple parties or multiple ethnic groups to cluster on the same 
party.  However, the lax standard is likely to show high rates of clustering in countries in all 
multi-ethnic countries, regardless of whether parties use ethnicity to mobilize support.  The 
polarization literature, in contrast,  emphasizing homogeneous groups with heterogeneous 
                                                 
6 American National Election Studies, http://www.electionstudies.org//nesguide/toptable/tab2a_2.htm.  The 
ANES asks follow-up questions to probe the strength of partisan affiliation more deeply, identifying 
“leaning independents”, “weak partisans” and “partisans”.  The sum of true independents and 
leaning independents ranges from 25 to more than 40 percent of the electorate.  A comparable 
procedure in the Afrobarometer survey would likely have a similar effect on measures of partisan 
indifference, by identifying, among those who say they are “close to a party”, a large group that is 
“less close”.   16
preferences, implies a stricter “monogamous” standard, in which clustering occurs if one and 
only one group disproportionately supports one party and no other.7  
The analysis here therefore examines five clustering rules.  At one end is the lax 
definition.  An ethnic group clusters when the fraction of respondents from group i who 









, where  ij   
is the number from ethnic group i who support party j, and N is the total population of 
respondents who express a partisan preference.8  This admits all manifestations of clustering, 
including those matching many groups to a party and many parties to a group.  In constrast, 
the strict, monogamous definition allows one and only one ethnic group k to cluster on one 
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Three intermediate rules are also examined.  One applies the lax rule, but requires 







:  the group’s share of support for the party must exceed its population 
share by at least 25 percent.  It is possible that multiple parties represent the interests of an 
ethnic group.  The second intermediate rule, “one group-many parties”, captures this by 
coding ethnic groups as clustered if they disproportionately support one or more parties, but 
                                                 
7 By this “monogamous” standard, if even a very small group clusters on a party also preferred by a 
large ethnic group, neither group is classified as clustered, but both cluster by the “lax” standard.   
8 This is consistent with most discussions of ethnic clustering, which look at the votes a group casts 
as a fraction of total votes cast rather than of all registered voters.     17
no other groups cluster on those same parties.  Finally, some ethnic groups may in fact have 
common preferences.9  The third intermediate cluster variable, “one party-many groups”, 
therefore classifies ethnic groups as clustered if they disproportionately support one and only 
one party, whether or not other groups also cluster on that party.   
Small ethnic groups and small parties can introduce distortions.  If a tiny ethnic 
group clusters on a large party that is also the favored party of a large ethnic group, neither 
group is classified as strictly clustered.  In contrast, if a small fraction of a large ethnic group 
provides disproportionate support for a very small party, it could be classified as strictly 
clustered.  To minimize such distortions, respondents from ethnic groups that comprise less 
than five percent of the sample are simply excluded from the analysis.  In addition, groups 
are not recorded as clustering if they disproportionately support parties with less than 5 
percent support in the sample.   
The clustering variables are based on answers to two questions in the Afrobarometer 
survey.  Question 86 of the Afrobarometer survey asks, conditional on respondents 
expressing a partisan preference, which party they prefer.  Respondent ethnicity is based on 
question 79, asking respondents to self-identify their ethnic group with the open-ended 
question “What is your tribe?” and the prompt “You know, your ethnic or cultural group.”  
Ethnic classifications are therefore generated by the self-perceptions of respondents and are 
                                                 
9 For example, the salient ethnic groups that emerge from the self-identification question in 
Afrobarometer are sometimes more disaggregated than those identified by outside observers (e.g., 
Alesina, et al. 2002).  The “many groups-one party” clustering rule then captures whether a party 
makes a credible commitment to pursue the common interests of these ethnic groups.     18
not driven by external judgments; nor are they influenced by pre-set classifications into 
which respondents are expected to fit themselves.   
Self-identification could introduce bias.  As Chandra (2004) and Posner (2005) argue, 
ethnic identification can change depending on the salience of ethnicity in politics:  if 
politicians make ethnicity a political issue, individuals are more likely to self-identify as 
members of an ethnic group.  If this introduces bias, however, it is in favor of the hypothesis 
that ethnic clustering is associated with a higher rate of partisan preference.  The ethnicity 
that individuals choose for themselves is at least partly determined by the appeals made by 
parties.  If parties make credible appeals to an ethnic group, individuals are more likely to 
self-select into that ethnic group, increasing the fraction of the respondents from that ethnic 
group that express support for a political party.   
In any case, however, the results below do not depend on the proximity of elections 
in countries.  Moreover, only 1,410 out of 23,093 respondents, about 6 percent, did not 
assign themselves an ethnic identity.  Almost half of these are from Tanzania, 619 (out of 
1304 respondents).  Tanzania, consistent with the arguments here, exhibits little clustering 
and clustered groups are not more likely to express a partisan preference.   
Control variables 
Numerous control variables capture non-ethnic factors that might influence 
respondents’ partisan preferences in the event that ethnicity is less salient.  The coefficient 
on the clustering variable is insensitive to the presence of these controls for these factors, 
however, suggesting that the relative salience of ethnic and non-ethnic issues injects little or 
no bias into the estimates here. 
Non-ethnic appeals could concern citizen wealth, religion, education, gender, 
occupation, or age, all of which are controlled for.  The specifications include a variable,   19
based on Question 93, that is the fraction of five assets that households own: a radio, 
television, bicycle, motorcycle and car.  Results are insensitive to alternative formulations, 
including the use of five dummy variables.  Controls are also included for whether the 
respondent has a religious affiliation, what religion that is, and how often the respondent 
participates in religious services (questions 91 and 92).  The survey asks for respondent’s 
highest level of educational attainment (question 90), gender, age and occupation; these are 
also taken into account.   
Harding (2008) uses citizen access to services as a proxy for whether respondents are 
urban residents or not, a status that is not captured directly in the Afrobarometer survey.  
Here, the services variable is the average of dichotomous variables created from answers to 
question 116, indicating whether respondents have easy access to a post office, school, 
police station, electricity, water, sewage and/or health clinic.  Consistent with the notion that 
clientelist appeals and networks are weaker in urban than in rural areas, access to services is 
strongly, negatively associated with expressions of partisan preference. The efficacy of 
partisan appeals to an ethnic group might also vary with the share of the group in the overall 
population; each group’s population share is therefore taken into account.   
Though the literature on African politics does not anticipate this, parties could 
mobilize support through their policy stance on the role of government in the economy, as 
in established Western democracies. Parties that succeed in doing so would attract the 
support of citizens who share their views on these issues, leading these respondents to 
express a partisan preference.  Respondent attitudes to government intervention in the 
economy are reflected in question 19 of the Afrobarometer survey, which asks whether the 
respondent believes that people should look after themselves and be responsible for their 
own success or whether the government should bear the main responsibility for their well-  20
being.  Approximately 47 percent of all respondents believe that individuals are responsible 
for their own welfare, while 49 percent believe that government has an important role to 
play.  This variable is equal to one for respondents who believe that individuals are 
responsible for their own success and zero otherwise.   
Opinions about democracy are relevant in two ways.  First, some parties are 
associated with the transition to democracy; the appeal of such parties can be captured by 
controlling for respondents’ attitudes towards democracy.  Second, a sense of civic 
responsibility may lead respondents to support some party, independent of the credibility of 
the party’s commitments, in order to fully participate in the democratic process.  In question 
37, respondents indicate whether they believe that democracy is preferable to any other kind 
of government, whether non-democratic governments might be preferable, or whether the 
type of government does not matter.  More than 60 percent of respondents agree that it is 
the best form of government.  The democracy variable is coded one for respondents who 
believe democracy is always better and zero otherwise.   
In all democracies, partisan preference is strongly associated with ex post evaluations 
of incumbent performance.  On the one hand, good performance should inspire greater 
partisan attachment.  On the other hand, respondents’ evaluation of incumbent performance 
could be influenced by whether the politician is from the party they favor.  However, this 
second possibility is most likely when political parties can credibly represent the interests of 
broad groups of citizens.  One indication that, unlike the United States, partisan preference 
does not drive incumbent approval, is the high percentage of African respondents – 34 
percent – who approve of incumbent performance, but do not express a partisan preference.  
The corresponding figure in the United States is only 8.6 percent (American National 
Election Studies, http://www.electionstudies.org//nesguide/toptable/tab2a_2.htm).     21
In a non-credible environment, the association between incumbent approval and 
partisan preference should be asymmetric.  In line with Ferejohn (1986), citizen reliance on 
ex post evaluations should lead them to prefer the party of the incumbent who meets a 
performance threshold.  However, when challengers are not credible, disapproval of 
incumbent performance should not be associated with higher rates of partisan preference.   
Questions 65a and 65b in the Afrobarometer survey gauge respondent opinions of 
the incumbent with the questions, “How well or badly is government managing the 
economy?”  and, “How well or badly is the government creating jobs?”  Nearly all 
respondents express a negative or positive opinion (94 and 96 percent, respectively).  Two 
variables are created from these questions, equaling one if respondents answered “fairly 
well” or “very well” and zero otherwise.  If both incumbent and challenger parties are 
credible, this variable should be insignificant.    
Ethnic grievances can also influence partisan preferences.  They might emerge 
because the group is unrepresented, or grievances might prompt the emergence of a party 
that represents the group.  The grievance variable is based on two questions.  Question 80a 
asks whether the respondent believes the economic condition of the respondent’s ethnic 
group is worse or better than that of other groups.  Question 81 asks whether the 
respondent believes the government treats the respondent’s ethnic group unfairly.  Ethnic 
grievance is then a dichotomous variable that equals one if, in response to question 81, 
respondents indicated that their group was often or always treated unfairly by the 
government and if, in response to question 80a, respondents indicated that their group was 
economically worse off or much worse off than other groups.10  11.5 percent of 
                                                 
10 The majority of those with grievances belong to large ethnic groups.  In Ghana, 67 of 140   22
respondents expressed a grievance, which is slightly negative correlated (-.03) with the lax 
definition of clustering and slightly positively with the strict definition (.03 percent).   
Gift-giving is an alternative strategy of electoral mobilization that scholars associate 
with weakly credible politicians.  Pre-electoral gifts can be rationalized as efforts by 
politicians to build credibility (Lindberg 2003 makes this point for Africa), or as emerging 
when politicians can sanction voter shirking in the gift-vote exchange more easily than voters 
can sanction politicians for shirking on their commitments to pursue particular policies in 
exchange for votes.11  Scholars often use pre-electoral gifts as an indicator of clientelist 
strategies of electoral mobilization (e.g., Harding 2008).     
Question 57f asks whether, during the last election, a candidate or someone from a 
party offered something a gift in return for the respondent’s vote.  19 percent of 
respondents report having been offered a gift.  In the African context, gift-giving is generally 
controlled by candidates and usually aimed at building their personal constituency.  To the 
extent that candidates, rather than parties, take credit for gifts, the estimated effect of gift-
giving on partisan preferences is likely to be a lower bound on its electoral importance.   
                                                                                                                                                 
aggrieved respondents were Akan or Ewe,  each of which dominates a political party in Ghana.  
Among the aggrieved Akan and Ewe, about two-thirds express a partisan preference, about the same 
as the non-aggrieved.  In Kenya, 60 of 154 Luo claimed an ethnic grievance, of whom 27 percent 
expressed partisan indifference.  This is not substantially lower than the 35 percent indifference rate 
of Luo respondents  who did not claim an ethnic grievance.   
11 For example, in the Philippines, notorious for its non-programmatic parties, vote-buying in 
municipal elections, is verifiable:  ballots are printed on carbon paper; voters can retain their carbon 
copies and present them for payment to the candidate whom they supported. Stuti Khemani, 
personal communication.   23
Table 1:  Summary of main variables 
 Obs.  Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Any partisan preference (0=disaffection)?  23075  .59  .49  0  1 
Prefers democracy?  23093  .62  .45  0  1 
Any opinion about democracy?   23085  .72  .45  0  1 
Believes individual is more responsible for own 
welfare than government (“self-reliance”)? 
23093 .47  .50  0  1 
Any opinion about “self-reliance”?   23083  .96  .19  0  1 
Approves of incumbent performance on job 
creation?  
23093 .27  .45  0  1 
Any opinion about incumbent jobs performance?   23093  .96  .19  0  1 
Approves of incumbent performance on the 
economy?  
23093 .49  .50  0  2 
Any opinion about incumbent economy 
performance?  
23093 .94  .23  0  1 
Respondent offered gifts by candidates?   22822  .19  .39  0  1 
Frequency of candidate gift giving (Never, rarely 0, 
Usually, always, 1) 
21951 .72  .45  0  1 
Do politicians keep their promises? (Never/rarely, 0– 
Usually/always,1) 
22488 .17  .37  0  1 
Ethnic grievance?   23093  .11  .32  0  1 
Fraction of seven public services they receive   23058  .43  .29  0  1 
 
The surveys also ask respondents whether they believe politicians generally offer 
gifts.  Question 78f asks respondents how often politicians offer gifts to voters during 
campaigns.  More than 70 percent of respondents across all surveys report that politicians do 
this often or always.  The analysis also controls for a variable created from question 78c, “In 
your opinion, how often do politicians keep their campaign promises after elections?”  The 
dichotomous variable created from this question is one if respondents answered always or 
often and zero if they answered rarely or never.  17 percent of respondents indicate that 
politicians always or usually keep their promises.  Table 1 summarizes all of the variables 
used in the analysis.   24
Ethnic clustering and partisan preferences 
Rates of clustering depend heavily on which of the five cluster rules is used, but the 
rates at which members of clustered and unclustered groups express a partisan preference 
differ by much less.  Table 2 summarizes these differences.  Under the lax rule, clustering is 
nearly universal, suggesting that such a rule might record any country with a diverse 
population as exhibiting clustering, regardless of the salience of ethnic appeals.  The rates of 
clustering drop significantly under the other four rules.   
Table 2:  Summary of clustered respondents according to different cluster rules 
Cluster rule  Percent of respondents from clustered ethnic 
groups (# countries with clustered ethnic groups) 
Lax (many parties-many groups)  89.7% (16) 
Lax with 25% threshold  44.8 (15) 
One group-many parties  28.8 (11) 
One party-many groups  60.5 (16) 
Monogamous (one party-one group)  23.4 (8) 
Note:  See text for explanation of cluster rules.  There are 17,353 observations in which respondents 
answered questions about ethnicity and partisan preference and belonged to ethnic groups with more 
than 5 percent of the respondent population. 
Applying the 25 percent threshold to the lax rule, clustering drops to 49 percent of 
respondents.  By requiring clustered ethnic groups to be represented by only one party (“one 
party-many groups”), the rate of clustering falls to 60.5 percent.  The restriction that only 
one group can cluster on a party reduces the observed rate of clustering by an additional 30 
percentage points to 28.8 percent.  The combination of both criteria in the monogamous 
cluster rule yields a further drop in observed rates of clustering to 23.4 percent.  The number 
of countries that exhibit any clustering follows the same pattern:  all 16 countries under the 
lax rule, but only eight under the monogamous rule.   25
Kenya provides a useful illustration of how the rules work in practice.  Discussions 
of ethnic conflict there always invoke the Kikuyu and Luo.  Each of these groups easily 
meets the lax standard for clustering:  Kikuyus constitute 28 percent of respondents who 
expressed support for the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), significantly more than the 
19 percent of respondents who gave their ethnicity as Kikuyu.  Similarly, Luo respondents, 
who comprise 13 percent of respondents, constituted half of all respondents who indicated 
that they preferred the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  However, only the Luo meet the 
monogamous clustering standard.  The Luo were the only ethnic group to give the LDP 
disproportionate support, but in addition to the Kikuyu, the Kamba and Meru (together, 17 
percent of Kenyan respondents) disproportionately supported the NARC.  This illustrates 
the appropriateness of the stricter clustering criteria:  it is implausible that the central appeal 
of the NARC would have been its commitment to defend the interests of Kikuyu, who 
comprised only 27 percent of its support base and were not the only ethnic group that 
disproportionately embraced it. 
Though rates of clustering vary significantly across clustering rules, rates at which 
respondents express a partisan preference do not.  This provides some reassurance that the 
choice of rule does not drive the results, and additional evidence that ethnic appeals seem to 
have only a modest impact.  Table 3 illustrates this, using the lax and monogamous rules 
from column 2 in Table 2.  The first three rows of Table 3 display the fraction of 
respondents who express a partisan preference in three groups of countries:  those in which 
all respondents belong to clustered groups, according to the given rule; where some 
respondents are clustered and others are not; and where no respondents belong to clustered 
ethnic groups.  Rates of partisan preference are similar among the three groups and across 
the three clustering rules, ranging from .57 to .66.     26
Table 3:   Fraction expressing partisan preferences across clustered and non-
clustered groups 
% of population expressing 
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Note:  Respondents from groups with less than 5% of population are excluded.   
 
The last three rows of the table compare respondents who belong and do not belong 
to clustered ethnic groups, or who are excluded from the analysis by the 5 percent rule, in 
countries where both types exist.  The key point to notice is that the stricter the clustering 
rule, the smaller is the difference in rates of partisan preference between clustered and 
unclustered respondents; the difference is 10 percentage points between the 89 percent of 
respondents who are clustered under the lax rule and the 11 percent who are not; it is seven 
percentage points between the 60.5 percent of respondents who are clustered under the one 
party-many groups rule versus the 39.5 who are not; and it is three percentage points for the 
strictest, monogamous rule.  The regression analysis in the next section confirms that these 
differences are small even when many other factors are taken into account.     27
Clustering and partisan preferences across countries 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis of the aggregate data.  The 
estimates pool all countries, controlling for invariant, unobserved country effects with 
country dummies.  The differences in partisan preferences between clustered and 
unclustered groups are identified only by within-country variation in those countries that 
have both clustered and unclustered groups.  Under the lax rule, all 16 countries exhibit 
clustering, but in only six are some clustered and some not.  Applying the 25 percent 
threshold to the lax rule, 16 countries are still clustered, but in 13 there is within-country 
variation.  Under the one group-many parties rule, 11 countries exhibit clustering; in all of 
these, clustering is partial.  Under the one party-many groups rule, all 16 countries again 
exhibit clustering, and in 15 it is partial.  Finally, under the monogamous rule, nine countries 
exhibit clustering; in all cases, it is partial.   
The first (bivariate) and second (multivariate) estimates of the clustering coefficient 
in Table 4 indicate that clustering is statistically significant in all five specifications, but the 
magnitude of the effect is generally small.  The similarity of the estimates between the 
bivariate and multivariate specifications indicates that the appeal of non-parties is not a 
source of bias.  Under the lax clustering rule, are the odds that a respondent from a clustered 
group expresses a partisan preference large (56 percent greater) relative to the odds for a 
respondent from other groups.12  However, when one restricts attention only to those 
                                                 
12 Even a high odds ratio can obscure a smaller real difference between the cases.  For example, 
although the odds ratio in the first column is high, the difference in the probability that clustered and 
unclustered respondents will express a partisan preference is much lower:  77 percent of clustered 
respondents express a partisan preference, compared to 68 percent of non-clustered respondents; the 
9 percentage point difference is sufficient to generate an odds ratio of 1.56.     28
instances where the ethnic group’s support for a party exceeds its population share by 25 
percent, the odds are only 24.8 percent greater.  They drop further with the stricter 
definitions, to 18 percent, 9.6 percent and 13 percent.  Statistical significance is unsurprising:  
any condition from fear to reliance on clientelism could generate such a result.  However, if 
credible appeals to co-ethnics were the dominant form of political mobilization, the 
magnitude of the clustering coefficient would be large.  This is not the case.   
Another way to see that the effect is not large is to compare it to estimates of the 
effects of other strategies of electoral mobilization, particularly those associated with political 
competition under conditions of limited political credibility.  The odds that respondents who 
received a gift also express a partisan preference are 35 percent greater than the odds of 
respondents who received no gift and constant across clustering rules.  The odds that those 
who approve of both incumbent jobs and economic performance express a partisan 
preference are 40 percent greater than those who disapprove of both, also larger than most 
of the cluster coefficients.  This is also an indication of low credibility, indicating that those 
who disapprove have no credible party that they can support.13   
Urban respondents (respondents with more access to public services), are less easily 
reached with clientelist promises.  The odds that those who receive all seven services would 
express a partisan preference were 26 percent less (from odds ratios of approximately .74) 
than the odds of those who received no services.   
                                                 
13 It could be that citizens from the same ethnicity as the incumbent are more likely to express 
support for the incumbent, so that the incumbent controls bias downwards the effects of the ethnic 
clustering variable.  However, the estimated coefficients on the ethnic clustering variables are nearly 
the same, with or without all of the controls, including incumbent approval.     29
Table 4:  How much more likely are respondents from clustered ethnic groups to 
express a partisan preference?   
(Logit estimation; coefficients are odds ratios; robust z-statistics in parentheses) 
Dependent variable:  
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Observations 16017  16017  16017  16017  16017 
Pseudo R-squared  0.10  0.0986  0.0977  0.0975  0.0975 
Note:  Country fixed effects and other controls not reported.  Students, those working in the home, 
those who never had a job and those with no religion are significantly less likely to express a partisan 
preference.  Younger respondents, men, Catholics, evangelical Protestants, Sunni Muslims and other 
Muslims (not Shiite) are significantly more likely.  These controls are insignificant:  population share 
of ethnic group; whether respondent expresses an ethnic grievance; whether respondent believes 
individual is more responsible for own welfare than government; respondent’s level of education; 
whether respondent belongs to a mainline Protestant church or is Christian with no specific sectarian 
affiliation; frequency of attendance at church services; and whether respondent is a subsistence or 
peasant farmer or vendor/hawker.   
Respondents who believe politicians usually keep their promises are significantly 
more likely to exhibit a partisan preference.  However, only 17 percent of respondents   30
express this belief, suggesting that the ability of parties to make broadly credible 
commitments is not the source of their optimistic view.  At the same time, the question is 
not specific about the type of promises that are kept.  Given the narrow group of 
respondents who regard politician promises as credible, these are more likely to be clientelist 
promises associated with political competitors who cannot make broadly credible policy 
promises.   
The odds that those who believe democracy is the best form of government express 
a partisan preference are 36 percent greater.  The odds that respondents with all five assets 
express a partisan preference are 66 percent greater than for respondents with none.  
Women are far less likely to express a partisan preference than men.   
The country fixed effects (not reported) are large, but consistent with other 
information.  For example, political parties in Benin and Madagascar are known to be weak.  
The odds that respondents from either of these countries express a partisan preference are 
about 58 percent and 69 percent lower than the odds that a Zambian respondent expresses a 
preference (Zambia is the omitted country to which all others are compared).  Mozambique 
has a well-organized ruling party (Frelimo).  Correspondingly, the odds that respondents 
from Mozambique express a preference are more than 400 percent greater than those for 
Zambian respondents.   
The importance of the country fixed effects suggests that the aggregate results may 
obscure large differences in the effects of ethnic clustering across countries.  The next 
section demonstrates that the modest effect of ethnic clustering on partisan preferences is 
reflected at the country level, as well.  On the one hand, clustering has a statistically 
insignificant impact on rates of partisan preference in about half of the countries where 
clustering is partial.  On the other hand, even in countries where clustering has a significant   31
effect on partisan preference, it is implausible that credible appeals by political parties to 
serve the collective interests of ethnic groups can explain it.   
Individual country results 
The number of countries that exhibit within country variation with respect to 
clustering varies by clustering rule.  For each of these countries, using the specifications in 
Table 4, the effects of clustering on partisan preference are separately estimated.  However, 
Table 5 displays, for each country and each specification, the results for just two variables:  
ethnic clustering and whether the respondent received a gift.   
Six countries exhibit within-country variation with respect to the lax cluster criteria.  
In three of these, clustered ethnic groups are more likely to exhibit a partisan preference.  
Gift-giving is also significantly associated with partisan preferences in three countries.  
Under the lax rule with the 25 percent threshold, 13 countries exhibit within-country 
variation, but again, in only three of these is ethnic clustering associated with partisan 
preferences, compared to seven where gift-giving is significantly associated with having a 
partisan preference.  Under the rule that allows clustering only if one group clusters on one 
or several parties, 10 countries exhibit within-country variation.  In three of these, 
respondents from clustered ethnic groups are more likely to exhibit a partisan preference; in 
seven they are not.  In four of the ten, gift-giving is significant.  There is within-country 
variation in 15 countries under the fourth rule, which allows clustering if a group clusters on 
only one party, even if multiple groups cluster on the same party.  In only two of these 
countries is ethnic clustering significantly and positively associated with expressing a partisan 
preference; in one (Uganda) it is negatively associated; and in the remainder it is insignificant.  
Gift-giving is significant in six of the countries.  Finally, nine countries vary with respect to   32
the monogamous clustering rule (one party/one group).  In two of these, clustering is 
significantly associated with partisanship; in four, gift-giving is significant.   
For most countries and most clustering rules, therefore, political parties do not make 
credible commitments to serve the interests of ethnic groups.  Gift-giving is a more 
prominent correlate of partisan preferences, despite the fact that gift-giving in Africa is 
generally candidate-driven and not organized by political parties.   
Qualitative evidence from several of these countries further supports the claim that 
the basis for ethnic clustering of partisan preferences is unlikely to be the credible 
commitments of political competitors to improve the welfare of ethnic groups.  The three 
countries in which clustering has the most consistent effect on partisan preferences are 
Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa.  In Mozambique and South Africa, ethnic groups 
cluster on ruling parties that are well-organized and long-lived:  FRELIMO in Mozambique 
was 43 years old in 2005, and the ANC in South Africa 93 years old (Beck, et al. 2001, 
Database of Political Institutions).  These parties have undergone leadership changes and are 
associated with the interests of particular ethnic groups (e.g., the Xhosa in South Africa, only 
22 percent of whom express partisan indifference, compared to 55 percent of Afrikaans 
respondents and 42 percent of Zulu respondents).  They are exceptional in Sub-Saharan 
Africa:  the average age of political parties in the rest of the continent was 17.2 years.   
A closer look at Kenya, in contrast, indicates the improbability of parties making 
credible appeals to ethnic groups, suggesting that ethnic clustering must have other 
explanations.  The Luo and Kalenjin are the only two groups of respondents who meet all 
clustering criteria in Kenya.  However, the two parties on which they cluster (the LDP and 
the Kalenjin’s Kenya African National Union, or KANU) do not appear to make broadly 
credible appeals.  Like the unclustered Kikuyu, of whom 35 percent express partisan   33
indifference, 32 percent of Luo and 41 percent of Kalenjin do, as well.  The weakness of 
Kenyan political parties makes these responses entirely understandable.  The LDP was only a 
few years old in 2005 and did not contest the 2007 elections.  KANU was the party of the 
autocrat Daniel Moi, a Kalenjin, but structured to maintain him in power rather than to 
further the interests of all Kalenjin.  Even if Kalenjin were disproportionate targets of 
clientelist payoffs by the regime, most Kalenjin did not benefit and, correspondingly, a large 
fraction of Kalenjin are indifferent to KANU’s appeal.   
Instead, it is more likely that grievance or fear, rather than the credibility of party 
promises to ethnic groups, drive clustering.  Mueller (2008) examines endemic inter-ethnic 
violence or threats of violence associated with electoral competition in Kenya.  Consistent 
with the possibility that fear or grievance, rather than the credibility of the LDP, drove Luo 
support for the party, 39 percent of the Luo in the sample expressed ethnic grievance, but 
only two of the (unclustered) Kikuyu respondents.   
In contrast, although Ghana exhibits ethnic clustering, and has, by the standards of 
African democracies, institutionalized political parties, having seen changes of leadership 
within each party, clustered groups are not more likely to express a partisan preference.14  
Gift-giving is key.  Lindberg (2003) and others emphasize the burden of gift-giving that 
candidates face, a burden that is reflected in the significance of Ghana’s gift-giving 
coefficient in Table 5.  In contrast, overt ethnic appeals seem to play little role in Ghanaian 
                                                 
14 52 percent of survey respondents were Akan, as were 64 percent of the respondents who 
supported the largest party, the National People’s Party.  The Ewe comprised 27 percent of the 
support base of the National Democratic Party (the party of the former dictator, Jerry Rawlings) and 
14 percent of all respondents.     34
political campaigns. The Center for the Development of Democracy-Ghana held debates for 
parliamentary candidates in 24 constituencies across the country in 2004 and recorded the 
proceedings of 15 of them in detail (CDD, no date).  Ethnic appeals were not apparent.  Of 
14 NPP candidates who appeared in these debates, eight made no mention at all of the 
national party, despite the generally recognized success of the NPP’s first four years in 
government.  Only five of all the NPP candidates mentioned policy issues that extended 
beyond the constituency; the remainder focused on their individual performance, generally 
their contribution to local public works projects and to targeted transfers, such as student 
scholarships, many funded out of their own pockets or out of the MPs’ Common Fund.   
South Africa and Mozambique are two of only four countries in the sample that use 
proportional representation, which mitigates the incentives of candidates to build a personal 
constituency and might explain the efficacy of ethnic appeals.  Benin and Namibia are the 
other two.  However, Benin, in contrast to Mozambique and South Africa, exhibits the 
highest rate of partisan indifference in the sample and no evidence that clustered ethnic 
groups are more likely to express a partisan preference.  Again unlike South Africa and 
Mozambique, political parties in Benin are fragmented; none has experienced a change of 
leadership and the average party age of the three largest government parties and the main 
opposition party in 2005 was less than 10 years.     35
Table 5: Partisan preferences, ethnic clustering and vote-buying across 16 countries 
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Table 5 (con’t): Partisan preferences, ethnic clustering and vote-buying  










































































































































Note:  Country-by-country regressions of the specifications in Table 4.  The table reports the 
estimated odds ratio and z-statistic for the respective clustering variable and whether respondent was 
offered a gift.  No estimates indicate either 100% clustering or no clustering in the country.   
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As in Kenya, ethnic conflict in Nigeria is endemic and parties are fragile.  The largest 
governing party was only seven years old in 2005.  Rates of partisan indifference are 
correspondingly greater than 50 percent among clustered and unclustered groups.  However, 
unlike Kenya, clustered groups are not more likely to express a partisan preference.  Instead, 
gift-giving plays a large role.  In fact, 37 percent of Hausas (one of the clustered groups) and 
more than half the 59 percent of Hausas who express a partisan preference indicated that 
they had been offered a gift.  Vote-buying has a correspondingly strong effect across all 
definitions of clustering:  the odds that a respondent who had been offered a gift by a 
politician expresses a partisan preference are more than twice those of respondents who had 
not, substantially higher than the aggregate effects.   
Religious polarization is another characteristic of Nigeria and could bias the results 
on ethnic polarization.  Specifically, if parties make strong appeals to religious groups, 
members of those religious groups could exhibit very low rates of partisan indifference, such 
that rates of partisan indifference among clustered ethnic groups look high by comparison.  
However, the specifications in Table 4, replicated for Nigeria in Table 5, control for religious 
affiliation, eliminating this source of bias. Moreover, though Sunni and  other non-Shiite 
Muslims are more likely to express a partisan preference, they do not appear to cluster their 
support.  The two groups disproportionately expressed support for two parties, the PDP and 
the ANPP, and one of those parties, the PDP, is also disproportionately supported by 
Catholics and mainstream Protestants.   
Zambia is the focus of many studies of ethnicity in African politics, with 
pathbreaking work by Posner (2004) demonstrating the shifting efforts of politicians to 
target particular ethnic groups depending on the political exigencies and institutional 
arrangements that they confronted.  The very fact that their focus shifted from one type of   38
ethnic cleavage to another suggests that they would have had difficulty making credible 
appeals to pursue the collective interests of any particular ethnic group, however.  The 
Zambian responses to the Afrobarometer survey are consistent with this.  All the Zambian 
ethnic groups comprising more than 5 percent of respondents, the Bemba, Tonga, Lozi, 
Chewa and Nsenga, meet the lax definitions of clustering.  None meet any stricter definition 
of clustering that requires some degree of “monogamous” sorting among parties and ethnic 
groups.  All express high rates of partisan indifference, 47 percent on average.  
 
Conclusion 
Analyses of ethnicity argue that development outcomes deteriorate when political 
competition is a contest between the collective interests of different ethnic groups.  Such a 
contest cannot emerge, however, if ethnic groups are not collectively organized.  The 
evidence here indicates that political parties in 16 African countries do not, with a few 
exceptions, facilitate that collective organization.  Numerous patterns in the data support this 
conclusion.   
First, ethnic clustering of partisan support is far from a universal phenomenon; by 
the strictest standards of clustering, only 25 percent of respondents to the Afrobarometer 
surveys belong to ethnic groups that cluster their partisan support.  Second, members of 
ethnic groups that cluster their partisan support are not substantially more likely to express a 
partisan preference.  In most countries with both types of groups, there is no significant 
difference in rates of partisan indifference between clustered and unclustered groups.  
Absolute rates of partisan indifference are high even where clustered groups are more likely 
to express a partisan preference than non-clustered groups.  Finally, clustering has a smaller   39
effect on partisan preferences than other determinants of partisan preference, some of which 
are associated with the lack of credibility of political appeals, such as vote-buying.   
This analysis does not say that ethnicity does not matter in African politics.  Rather, it 
shows that ethnic clustering of political support cannot easily be explained as a manifestation 
of collective action by co-ethnics to improve their collective welfare; such collective action is 
difficult when political parties cannot make credible appeals to pursue the collective interests 
of ethnic groups.  Instead, the salience of ethnicity is likely to be a byproduct of other 
features of the political environment.  If politicians exploit voters’ imperfect information to 
exacerbate fear, or rely on coercive authority over their co-ethnics, then the development 
effects associated with ethnicity are properly attributed to the absence of information and 
use of coercion.  If non-credible politicians exploit ethnically homogeneous patron-client 
networks to secure the support of narrow groups of voters, then it is the lack of credibility 
that matters for development rather than ethnicity itself.15   
These results are important because many analysts argue for institutional reforms 
specifically targeted at ethnicity to mitigate the risks of conflict.  Reynal-Querol (2002), for 
example, points to evidence that particular types of electoral and political institutions are 
likely to mitigate the risks of conflict, precisely because they facilitate inter-ethnic agreement, 
arguments reflected as well in Bardhan (1997) and institution-building strategies pursued by 
donors in post-conflict and other fragile countries.  The effects of institutional reforms are 
                                                 
15 Franck and Rainer (2009) find that the ethnic group of the leaders of 18 African countries spent 
more time in primary school and suffered lower rates of infant mortality, on average.  This is 
consistent with the reliance by leaders on ethnically homogeneous patron-client networks, which 
would, on average – but not for all – increase incomes of the leader’s ethnic group.     40
unlikely to be significant, however, in environments where politicians are unable to make 
broadly credible commitments to citizens.  Keefer (2007, 2008) finds, in fact, that several 
institutional strategies, such as proportional representation, have a limited impact on the 
policy choices of democracies or the probability of conflict among poor countries when one 
controls for measures of political credibility.  Instead, the analysis points to the need for 
research on institutional reforms aimed at reinforcing the ability of citizens to act 
collectively, and particularly those related to the institutionalization of political parties.    41
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